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Abstract In this paper, we assess climate change impacts on
an intensively managed grassland system at the Swiss Plateau
using the process-based grassland model PROGRASS. Taking
the CO2 fertilization into account, we find increasing yield
levels (in the range of 10–24%) and sharp increases in pro-
duction risks for an illustrative climate change scenario that
suggests a marked increase in temperature and decrease in
summer rainfall. Climate change–induced increases in the
coefficients of variation of grassland yields are in the range of
21 and 50%. This finding underpins that additional risk man-
agement strategies are needed to cope with climate-change
impacts on grassland production. The outputs from the grass-
land model are evaluated economically using certainty
equivalents, i.e., accounting for mean quasi rents and pro-
duction risks. To identify potential risk management strategies
under current and future climatic conditions, we consider
adjustments of production intensity and farm-level yield
insurance. The impact of climate change on production
intensities is found to be ambiguous: farmers’ will increase
intensity under unconstrained production conditions, but will
decrease production intensity in the presence of a cross-com-
pliance scheme. Our results also show that the considered
insurance scheme is a powerful tool to manage climate risks in
grassland production under current and future conditions
because it can reduce the coefficients of variation of quasi rents
by up to 50%. However, we find that direct payments tend to
reduce farmers’ incentives to use such insurance scheme.
Keywords Grassland production  Climate change 
Adaptation  Insurance
Introduction
Climate change is expected to affect agricultural produc-
tion through changes in the temperature and precipitation
regime and elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations (see
e.g., Olesen and Bindi 2002; Fuhrer 2003; Easterling et al.
2007; Torriani et al. 2007; Schaap et al. 2011). The
direction and magnitude of the impacts will depend on the
specific cropping system as well as on regional conditions
(Bindi and Olesen 2010), but there is little doubt that
adaptation measures at several levels are required (Risbey
et al. 1999; Kandlikar and Risbey 2000). Concerning the
agronomic practice, these adaptation options would pri-
marily relate to changes in land use (e.g., changes in crop
and cultivar choice) and crop management (e.g., changes in
input use, irrigation and sowing dates) (see e.g., Olesen and
Bindi 2004; Orlandini et al. 2008). From an economic
perspective, the expansion of existing as well as the
introduction of new agricultural insurance products may
assist farmers in coping with climate change–induced
changes in their income risks (e.g., Smit and Skinner 2002;
Torriani et al. 2008).
Climate-change impacts and adaptation in grasslands are
of particular importance because grasslands are a major
contributor to global food production, covering about 70%
of the world’s agricultural area (Soussana and Lu¨scher
2007). Previous studies have shown that climate change
could not only affect grassland productivity, but also
impact fodder quality and amplify weed problems (Calanca
and Fuhrer 2005; Fuhrer et al. 2006; Soussana and Lu¨scher
2007). Moreover, climate change is expected to increase
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production risks by increasing yield variability (Finger
et al. 2010). Due to the latter finding, agricultural insur-
ances are expected to offer a valuable contribution to
adaptation. In addition, adjustments in production intensi-
ties, in particular due to fertilizer use, can help to mitigate
negative impacts of climate change and reduce production
risks (e.g., Finger et al. 2010, 2011).
In this paper, we analyze the potential of these adapta-
tion strategies, i.e., insurance use and adjustments of pro-
duction intensities, in the context of climate-change
impacts on grassland systems of the Swiss Plateau. To this
end, we use the process-based grassland model PRO-
GRASS (Lazzarotto et al. 2009, 2010) which is combined
with an economic valuation approach that accounts for
mean profitability and production risks of grassland pro-
duction. Our analysis also accounts for the role of direct
payments and cross-compliance requirements for produc-
tion decisions. The choice of this case study was motivated
by the fact that Swiss grasslands, by providing the neces-
sary input to animal production, represent the backbone of
the agricultural sector (Calanca and Fuhrer 2005). At
present, combined peril (or multi-risk) insurances that are
available to Swiss farmers to cover risks in grassland
production only contemplate risks associated with hail,
storm, floods, excessive snow cover and landslides. How-
ever, no insurance scheme is available that covers also
risks related to drought and excess precipitation. Based on
this background, we examine in this paper the potential of
farm-level yield insurance that provides coverage against
all possible natural risks (Bielza et al. 2008). Similar
insurance schemes for grassland and pasture production are
already established in North America (e.g., Dismukes et al.
1995; Gloy and Staehr 2009).
Methodology
In a first step, we use the process-based grassland model
PROGRASS to simulate intensive grassland production
under current and future climatic conditions with different
levels of nitrogen application. We consider an intensively
managed grass/clover system on the Swiss Plateau (Oens-
ingen, 7440E, 47170N, 450 m a.s.l., see also Ammann
et al. 2007). The use of a biophysical model that accounts
for above- and below-ground processes as well as for the
interactions between plant functional types is necessary to
sufficiently account for the complexity of typical Swiss
grassland systems and to develop projections of grassland
production.
In a subsequent step, the output of this grassland model
is evaluated economically, accounting for mean quasi rents
(revenue minus variable costs) but also for production
risks. To this end, we employ certainty equivalents that
account for the mean as well as the dispersion and the
skewness of quasi rents. The economic analysis com-
prises the choice of the farmer to use specific amounts of
fertilizer, to receive direct payments (with the associated
cross-compliance requirements) and to adopt farm-yield
insurance. This analysis allows us to evaluate farmers’
adaptation options and to assess the effects of farm-level
yield insurance schemes on farmers’ income under current
and future climatic conditions.
Data generation with PROGRASS
We consider a grassland system consisting of a mixture of
two plant functional types, a tall-growing grass (Lolium
perenne L.) and a short-growing white clover species
(Trifolium repens L.). Such mixtures are typical for
intensive grasslands on the Swiss Plateau. For this system,
we estimate annual production under current and future
climatic conditions and with respect to different levels of
nitrogen applications using the PROductive GRASland
Simulator (PROGRASS) (Lazzarotto et al. 2009, 2010).
PROGRASS is a process-based model and accounts for key
aspects of intensive grassland dynamics, in particular
above- and belowground interactions between plant func-
tional types relatively to light interception and the acqui-
sition of soil mineral nitrogen (N) in response to climate
and nitrogen application. The model is driven with hourly
weather data, and requires specification of management
options relatively to the cutting and fertilization regime
(cutting dates, dates of the fertilizer applications), as well
as specification of initial conditions for above- and
belowground biomass, the soil organic and mineral N pools
and the soil moisture storage. Further details concerning
the model structure and requirements can be found in
Lazzarotto et al. (2009, 2010). As it explicitly considers the
effects of elevated CO2 concentrations on plant dynamics
(photosynthesis, stomatal conductance, biological N fixa-
tion) (Lazzarotto et al. 2010), atmospheric CO2 abundances
also need to be set.
As described in Lazzarotto et al. (2009), the model was
parameterized using data from a long-term free-air CO2
enrichment experiment run from 1993 to 2002 in Swit-
zerland (Hebeisen et al. 1997) and was tested with respect
to data collected since 2001 at our study site in Oensingen.
As shown in Lazzarotto et al. (2009), the model can
accurately reproduce dry-matter production, and relative
plant-functional type’s abundances in grassland systems as
often encountered on the Swiss Plateau. Moreover, the
model is able to realistically capture the effects of fertil-
ization (Lazzarotto et al. 2009).
Following Finger et al. (2010), the effects of fertilization
on grassland systems are examined by considering 10
different levels of mineral N application, with annual rates
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varying from 50 to 500 kg ha-1 in steps of 50 kg ha-1.
Furthermore, five cuts per year are assumed, which repre-
sents intensive management of grassland in Switzerland.1
Two climate scenarios are considered. The first (BASE
scenario) reflects current conditions (1981–2007), the sec-
ond (Climate Change) represents climatic conditions as
projected for 2071–2100 under the assumption of an A2
emission scenario (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) in a numerical
experiment carried out with the CHRM regional model
(Vidale et al. 2003) in the context of the EU PRUDENCE
project (Christensen and Christensen 2007). This particular
scenario was selected because it indicates very substantial
shifts in the regional climate of the Swiss Plateau
(Table 1), in particular concerning the summer precipita-
tion regime, and a marked increase in atmospheric CO2
burden (with a nominal value of 700 ppm as an average for
2071–2100).
Because the output of climate models is generally biased
(Hansen et al. 2006; Schmidli et al. 2006), the hourly
weather data necessary as input to PROGRASS were
obtained for both scenarios using a two-step downscaling
procedure.
In a first step, the LARS-WG stochastic weather
generator (Semenov and Barrow 1997; Semenov et al.
1998) was applied to obtain daily weather data for
minimum and maximum temperature, rain and solar
radiation for both the BASE and climate-change sce-
narios. As in the study by Lazzarotto et al. (2010) the
weather generator was conditioned using daily weather
observations for 1981–2007 obtained from an operational
weather station (Wynau, 7470E, 47150N, 422 m a.s.l.)
located close to our study site. This calibration generated
a series of monthly statistics (semi-empirical distribu-
tions of wet and dry spells length, rainfall amounts,
minimum and maximum temperature, solar radiation;
auto- and cross-correlations for minimum and maximum
temperature and solar radiation) that were subsequently
used to simulate synthetic data. For simulations under the
constraints imposed by a climate scenario, the statistics
listed in Table 1 were used to modify relevant parame-
ters of the generation process (see e.g., Semenov 2007,
for details). Although the values in Table 1 had to be
derived assuming 1961–1990 as a reference (i.e., the
reference period in the PRUDENCE experiments), the
statistics of Table 1 were internally rescaled in LARS-
WG to account for the fact that the observational data
cover the period 1981–2007. Daily values of the mini-
mum/maximum relative humidity (needed to estimate the
water vapor pressure) were further calculated from solar
radiation using statistical relations fitted to the observa-
tions for each month of the year and were assumed to be
valid also under future climatic conditions (Lazzarotto
et al. 2010).
In a second step, the synthetic daily data from LARS-
WG were post-processed according to Thornley and France
(2007) to calculate hourly data needed to drive PRO-
GRASS. For radiation, a weighted average of a full sine
and half sine curve were used to mimic the diurnal cycle,
whereas for temperature and relative humidity, a sinusoidal
progression was assumed, with maxima and minima at
dawn and 3 h after solar noon, respectively. In addition,
daily precipitation sums were uniformly distributed over
24 h, and wind speed was assumed constant at 1 m s-1. As
emphasized in Lazzarotto et al. (2010), the quality of the
hourly data was tested indirectly by assessing the differ-
ence in key PROGRASS outputs as computed driving the
model with observed or synthetic data. Relatively to
grassland production at Oensingen, no significant differ-
ence was found.
To limit the amount of data (recall that the two climate
scenarios are examined in combination with 10 N appli-
cation scenarios), only 25 years of synthetic weather data
were generated at hourly resolution for both the BASE and
climate-change scenarios. Finally, note that the use of a
stochastic weather generator with respect to the current
climate was motivated by the necessity to ensure consis-
tency between the two time frames.
Table 1 Climate-change scenario: Changes in monthly climate sta-
tistics between 2071–2100 and 1961–1990
Dr Dswet Dsdry DTmax DTmin DrT DGR
[-] [-] [-] [C] [C] [-] [-]
January 0.10 -0.09 -0.35 3.51 3.07 -0.20 0.07
February 0.44 0.19 -0.27 2.57 2.11 -0.21 -0.02
March 0.26 0.01 -0.30 1.93 1.38 -0.04 0.00
April -0.01 -0.14 0.11 2.99 2.15 0.18 0.14
May -0.23 -0.47 0.23 3.58 2.49 0.11 0.16
June -0.28 -0.28 0.75 4.07 2.89 0.33 0.13
July -0.47 -0.23 1.21 5.64 3.49 0.23 0.14
August -0.31 -0.25 0.79 7.05 4.28 0.13 0.17
September -0.28 -0.14 0.34 5.95 4.00 0.00 0.12
October -0.02 -0.19 0.08 4.40 3.00 0.11 0.16
November -0.34 -0.18 0.34 3.39 1.64 -0.04 0.32
December 0.06 0.15 -0.08 3.37 2.58 -0.21 0.23
Changes (D) in monthly climate statistics between 2071–2100 and
1961–1990 simulated by the regional climate model CHRM for the
Swiss Plateau under the assumption of an A2 emission scenario.
Changes in mean rainfall rate (r), duration of wet (swet) and dry
(sdry) spells, global radiation (GR) and inter-annual standard devia-
tion of air temperature (rT) are relative; changes in daily maximum
(Tmax) and minimum (Tmin) air temperature are absolute. Source:
Finger et al. (2010)
1 Because this study considers only intensive production, fertilizer
use below N = 50 kg N ha-1 year-1 as well as lower numbers of
cuts are not taken into account.
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Calculation of quasi rents
In order to evaluate the different management options of
the farmer, we assume that the farmer is a risk-averse
decision maker. In order to control for ‘profit maximizing’
decision makers, we include the analysis of a risk-neutral
farmer that faces the following optimization problem that
maximizes the expected quasi rents (e.g., Hardaker et al.
1997):
max
N;D
EðpÞ ¼ EðYðNÞÞP  cN þ D  DP ð1Þ
E(p) denotes the expected value of quasi rents (revenue
minus variable costs), other costs are assumed to be fixed
and thus irrelevant for the here considered decision making
context. P denotes the price for grassland yield (i.e., hay),
N is the amount of nitrogen employed, E(Y(N)) is the
expected grassland yield that depends on the fertilizer
amount N, c is the price of nitrogen and DP denote the
amount of direct payments (nonrandom annual payments).
D is an indicator function for the adoption of direct pay-
ments, showing that we analyze two options, one without
direct payments and an option that includes general direct
payments of DP = 1,040 CHF ha-1 per year. Thus, the
risk-neutral farmer maximizes his quasi rents with respect
to nitrogen use and the adoption of direct payments. More
than 90% of the Swiss farmers receive these general direct
payments and are thus integrated in a cross-compliance
scheme (BLW 2008). In order to receive general direct
payments, farmers must satisfy the conditions of the
so-called O¨kologischer Leistungsnachweis (proof of com-
pliance with ecological requirements) (Mann 2003). These
obligations are intended to protect soils and prevent excess
in the fertilizer balance. To prevent nutrient losses caused
by excessive fertilizer application, the application of fer-
tilizer is restricted to the nutrient requirements of the
plants. For intensively managed grasslands, nitrogen
application is restricted at 12 kg N per 1 t of grassland
yield (BLW 2006).2 Price levels are taken from the internet
database agrigate.ch operated by the Swiss Farmers’ Union
(SBV) and the Swiss Association for the Development of
Agriculture and Rural Areas (AGRIDEA). The output price
is equal to P = 150 CHF t-1, assuming hay to be sold
directly from the swath, with a high dry matter content
requiring no further ventilation. Ammonium nitrate with a
nitrogen content of 27.5% is assumed for grassland
fertilization with a price of 0.65 CHF kg-1, which is
equivalent to 2.36 CHF kg-1 for pure nitrogen.
Calculation of certainty equivalents
For the risk-neutral farmer, the optimal production
intensity does not depend on the variability or skewness
of yields and thus profits. In contrast, these higher
moments of the yield distribution are taken into account
in the framework of a risk-averse farmer. Note that the
here presented analysis focuses on production risks and
does not account for price risks. The here presented
framework of certainty equivalent maximization for a
risk-averse decision maker is taken from Di Falco and
Chavas (2006), who also provide a detailed description
and discussion of the power utility function underlying
the here presented analysis. The certainty equivalent is a
monetary measure which is the nonrandom (i.e., sure)
amount of income that gives the (risk averse) farmer the
same utility as a higher but random income and can be
defined as follows:
CE ¼ EðpÞ  RP ð2Þ
where CE denotes the certainty equivalent and RP is the
risk premium, i.e., the amount of money the decision
maker is willing to pay to replace the uncertain quasi
rent p by its mean E(p). RP \ 0, RP = 0, and RP [ 0
denote a risk-loving, risk-neutral and risk-averse decision
maker, respectively. The risk premium depends on the
risk preferences and the distribution of quasi rents.
Following Di Falco and Chavas (2006), we define the
(approximate) risk premium in our analysis as follows
(see Antle 1987, for a description of this moment-based
approach):
RP ¼ 1
2
r2M2 þ 1
6
r3M3 ð3Þ
Mi is the ith central moment of the distribution of quasi
rents and r2 is the coefficient of risk aversion. If r2 [ 0
(i.e., the farmer is risk averse), an increase in the variance
of quasi rents (i.e., M2) increases the risk premium, and
decreases the certainty equivalent. r3 describes the aversion
against downside risk, i.e., the (negative) skewness of quasi
rents (M3). If r3 \ 0, an increase in the negative skewness
(i.e., an increasing risk of facing ‘‘low-income’’ outcomes,
Chavas et al. 2010) of quasi rents increases the risk pre-
mium and decreases the certainty equivalent of the farmer.
The first, second, and third moments of quasi-rent dis-
tributions are estimated with the mean, variance, and
(unstandardized) skewness of the quasi rents. We assume
constant relative risk aversion, which corresponds to
decreasing absolute risk aversion with r2 = 2/E(p) and
r3 = -6/r
2(p). These levels (and forms) of risk aversion
2 In practice, farmers are required to show an equalized fertilizer
balance at their farm, where nitrogen needs for intensive grasslands
are calculated using the factor given above. Nitrogen applications
above this level increase the risks of nutrient losses to the
environment and are thus not allowed. Due to unforeseen (e.g.
weather) events, this critical value can be exceeded within a range of
tolerance.
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reflect frequently observed3 risk preferences with a mod-
erate risk aversion of the farmer (Di Falco and Chavas
2006). This choice of farmers’ risk preferences assumes
that the level of risk aversion decreases with increasing
level of quasi rents. Moreover, downside risk aversion is
assumed to decrease with increasing variance of quasi
rents.
Insurance application
To illustrate a potential insurance application, we use the
example of farm-level yield insurance based on the actual
production history of the farm (see Bielza et al. 2008, for
an overview on global applications). Such insurance
assumes a ‘‘guaranteed’’ yield, based on farm-level yield
history. The insurance is evaluated at the price level P. We
assume a coverage level of 90% (i.e., a deductible of 10%).
Thus, if the actual crop yield (Yi) falls below the 90th
percentile of average yields ( Y), the farmer is indemnified.
This yield level is the ‘trigger’ or ‘critical’ yield (Barnett
et al. 2005), YC ¼ 0:9 Y . Thus, the indemnity payment
function can be described as follows:
Indemnity ¼ maxf0; YC  Yig  P: ð4Þ
The premium of the insurance is calculated based on the
observed variability of crop yields4 and is equal to the
expected indemnity payment times a loading factor of 1.3
(e.g., for administrative costs, generating profits and
accumulation of reserves). Thus, we assume that the
insurance premium is 30% higher than the ‘fair premium’
that is equal to the expected indemnity payment. We use
nonparametric bootstrap to derive unbiased estimates of
expected indemnity payments. Insurance premiums are
calculated for specific levels of nitrogen application,
because different fertilizer use implies different production
risks. Thus, we assume that the farmer chooses the tech-
nology (level of N) if he contracts the insurance.5 In the
absence of an agreement on the production technology
used by the farmer, such insurance would imply problems
of moral hazard and adverse selection.
Therefore, we assume the farmer to maximize his cer-
tainty equivalents with respect to (a) the level of nitrogen
application (N), (b) the use of an insurance (I), where I is an
indicator function indicating the use of insurance (c) the
inclusion in the cross-compliance scheme (i.e., production
restrictions) that implies the receipt of direct payments (D).
These three variables determine the mean (E(p(N, I, D))),
the variance (r2(p(N, I, D))), and the skewness
(r3(p(N, I, D))) of quasi rents and are thus included in the
final certainty equivalent maximization problem of our
analysis that can be formulated as follows:
max CE
N;I;D
¼ EðpðN; I; DÞÞ  1
2
r2r
2ðpðN; I; DÞÞ
þ 1
6
r3r
3ðpðN; I; DÞÞ: ð5Þ
To analyze the sensitivity of our analysis with regard to the
employed parameters in the economic model, we conduct a
sensitivity analysis taking different levels of risk aversion,
loading factors, and direct payments into account.
In order to assess the reliability of the here calculated
point estimates for quasi rents and certainty equivalents, we
construct 95% confidence intervals of these estimates using
nonparametric bootstrap (see DiCiccio and Efron 1996, for
details). To this end, the above described values are esti-
mated for 9,999 data replicates that are generated by sam-
pling with replacement from each dataset. Furthermore, we
use these confidence intervals to test for significant differ-
ences between different levels of nitrogen application as
well as between climate scenarios, though we are aware that
the comparison of confidence intervals is a very conserva-
tive way of hypothesis testing (Schenker and Gentleman
2001). All statistical and graphical analysis presented in this
paper are conducted with the statistical language and envi-
ronment R (R Development Core Team 2008).
Results
Generated yield data
The simulated grassland yield data (i.e., the output of the
simulations with PROGRASS) are summarized in Table 2.
In this paper, grassland yield is defined as the sum of clover
and grass dry matter yields (i.e., above-ground biomass).
For the BASE scenario, it shows that grassland yield
increases with increasing nitrogen application (N), how-
ever, with decreasing marginal productivity. The standard
deviation (SD) nearly continuously increases with increas-
ing N, while the minimum coefficient of variation (CV) is
reached at 200 kg N ha-1 year-1. Moreover, we find a
contrary effect of nitrogen application on the skewness of
grassland yields. The negative skewness of grassland yields
increases till 200 kg N ha-1 year-1, but decreases hence-
forward. Thus, production risks show nonlinear patterns in
response to nitrogen application, which is caused by the
3 No estimates of risk aversion of Swiss farmers are available yet.
4 This means the 25 simulations for each N-level and climate
scenario that presented in Table 1 are used to estimate insurance
premiums. Thus, we assume that yield variability is known to both the
insurer and the insurant.
5 Such an agreement on a specific technology can be (partially)
controlled if farmers are required to submit field management handbooks
(records) to the insurance company, which is e.g. applied by the
Saskatchewan crop insurance (http://www.saskcropinsurance.com,
accessed March 07, 2011).
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interaction between clover and grass in the here analyzed
grassland system and their different responses to heat and
temperature stress as well as nitrogen application (see
Lazzarotto et al. 2009, for details). In particular, the clover
fraction decreases with increasing levels of nitrogen appli-
cation, which reflects enhanced competitive advantages of
the grass under high N application, both with respect to light
interception (Hautier et al. 2009) as well as soil mineral N
acquisition (Lazzarotto et al. 2009).
For the climate-change scenario, Table 2 shows that
grassland yields are higher than for current climatic con-
ditions, particularly due to the benefits of rising atmospheric
CO2 concentrations. These yield increases range between
10% (N = 500 kg ha-1) and 24% (for N = 50 kg ha-1).
This yield increase is in agreement with findings from
previous studies (e.g., Nijs et al. 1996; Riedo et al. 1999).
However, Table 2 shows furthermore that the rise in mean
yields is associated with a sharp increase in the standard
deviation of grassland yields and increasing coefficients
of variation. The climate change induced increases of
the coefficients of variation range between 21% (e.g., for
N = 500 kg ha-1) and 50% (for N = 150 kg ha-1). These
results indicate that climate change increases production
risks. However, we find a shift in the skewness of yields,
from negatively skewed yields under current to positively
skewed yields under future climatic conditions. In order to
validate the observed shifts in mean, dispersion and skew-
ness of grassland yields, we also considered robust meth-
ods6 that lead to similar results.
The observed increase in mean yields due to climate
change is positive for farmers. Ceteris paribus, also the
positive shift in skewness is beneficial for farmers because
the frequency of low-yield events is reduced. However, the
here found joint occurrence of this shift with an increasing
variance of yields is ambiguous for the farmers utility. To
(jointly) evaluate and quantify these effects, the certainty
equivalents are used (cp. Eq. 5). In summary, our
descriptive analysis of grassland yields shows that farmers
will benefit particularly from an increasing mean of
grassland yields, but suffer from much higher yield vari-
ability. A detailed description and discussion of the here
used dataset is given in Finger et al. (2010).
Estimated insurance premiums
Table 3 shows the calculated insurance premiums (IP) that
are equal to the expected indemnity payment (i.e., the
expected values below the trigger yield, evaluated at the
grassland price of 150 CHF t-1) times a loading factor of
1.3. Thus, these insurance premiums reflect the actual risk
that yields fall below the trigger yield, which is defined as
the 90th percentile of the expected (i.e., average) yield.
This risk (and thus the premium) varies with the level of
Table 2 Descriptive analysis of simulated grassland yields
N (kg ha-1) BASE scenario Climate-change scenario
Mean
(t ha-1)
SD
(t ha-1)
CV (stand.)
Skewn.
Kg N/mean
yield
Mean
(t ha-1)
SD
(t ha-1)
CV (stand.)
Skewn.
Kg N/mean
yield
50 8.82 1.31 0.15 -0.77 5.67 10.92 2.13 0.19 0.54 4.58
100 10.05 1.37 0.14 -0.85 9.95 11.63 2.15 0.19 0.52 8.60
150 10.88 1.31 0.12 -1.16 13.79 12.15 2.20 0.18 0.67 12.35
200 12.10 1.44 0.12 -1.25 16.53 12.98 2.10 0.16 0.45 15.41
250 13.27 1.62 0.12 -1.24 18.84 14.14 2.25 0.16 0.34 17.68
300 14.29 1.81 0.13 -1.20 20.99 15.26 2.46 0.16 0.32 19.66
350 15.14 1.98 0.13 -1.16 23.12 16.28 2.68 0.16 0.32 21.50
400 15.84 2.13 0.13 -1.12 25.25 17.17 2.88 0.17 0.34 23.30
450 16.41 2.26 0.14 -1.10 27.42 17.94 3.08 0.17 0.37 25.08
500 16.88 2.37 0.14 -1.08 29.62 18.60 3.25 0.17 0.39 26.88
Table 3 Insurance premiums (in CHF ha-1) for the BASE and the
climate-change scenario
N (kg ha-1) BASE Climate change
50 45.20 67.77
100 43.85 65.60
150 40.53 61.03
200 45.68 52.41
250 53.07 56.26
300 60.43 62.40
350 67.39 70.11
400 73.81 77.52
450 79.29 84.50
500 83.97 90.85
6 Robust methods to estimate the location, dispersion and skewness
of the yield distributions were the median, the Qn and the medcouple
estimator, respectively (see Brys et al. 2003, for details).
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nitrogen application and with the climate scenario. It shows
that premiums for current climatic conditions are lowest for
N = 150 kg ha-1.
For the climate-change scenario, insurance premiums
are higher than for the BASE scenario with the lowest
premium for N = 200 kg ha-1. However, the increase in
premiums from current to future climate is small com-
pared with the large increase in the standard deviation of
yields for the climate-change scenario (cp. Table 2),
particularly due to the shift toward more positively
skewed yields.
Results for quasi rents
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of the distributions of
quasi rents under current climate conditions for: (1) situations
without insurance and direct payments (p ¼ YðNÞ
150  2:36  N), (2) only with insurance (p ¼ YðN; IÞ
150  2:36  N  IPðNÞ), where Y(I) is the insured yield (i.e.,
yield distributions are truncated below the trigger yield), (3)
with direct payments only (p ¼ YðNÞ  150  2:36N þ DP),
and (4) accounting for both insurance and direct payments
(p ¼ YðN; IÞ  150  2:36  N  IPðNÞ þ DP).
Table 4 illustrates that the application of insurance has
three intuitive effects on the distribution of quasi rents: (1)
it decreases the mean quasi rent (because insurance pre-
miums exceed the indemnity payments), (2) it decreases
the variability (standard deviation) of quasi rents and (3)
removes a large part of negative skewness from the quasi
rents (i.e., quasi rents are more positively skewed).
The lower panel of Table 4 shows that direct payments
significantly increase the mean income levels (confidence
intervals are presented in the ‘‘Appendix’’). Moreover,
direct payments have also a risk decreasing (i.e., insur-
ance like) effect by increasing the expected quasi rent
while keeping the standard deviation unaffected. Thus,
direct payments lead to much lower coefficients of
variation.
Taking both insurance and direct payments into account,
our analysis shows that the relative variability (CV) of
quasi rents decreases in the range of a factor 2–3. For
instance, the coefficient of variation of quasi rents under
current climate for N = 200 kg ha-1 without direct pay-
ments and without insurance is equal to 0.16. The insur-
ance and receipt of direct payment reduce the coefficient of
variation to 0.11 and 0.09, respectively. With both
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of quasi rents (in CHF ha-1) for the BASE scenario
N (kg ha-1) Without insurance With insurance
Mean (CHF ha-1) SD (CHF ha-1) CV (-) Skewness (-) Mean (CHF ha-1) SD (CHF ha-1) CV (-) Skewness (-)
w/o direct payment
50 1,204.41 196.93 0.16 -0.77 1,193.98 137.59 0.12 0.08
100 1,270.97 205.79 0.16 -0.85 1,260.85 145.39 0.12 0.08
150 1,278.14 195.77 0.15 -1.16 268.79 133.21 0.10 -0.10
200 1,342.75 215.74 0.16 -1.25 1,332.21 143.91 0.11 -0.18
250 1,401.09 243.62 0.17 -1.24 1,388.84 161.23 0.12 -0.15
300 1,435.95 271.26 0.19 -1.20 1,422.01 179.19 0.13 -0.10
350 1,445.11 296.95 0.21 -1.16 1,429.56 196.10 0.14 -0.04
400 1,431.35 319.96 0.22 -1.12 1,414.32 211.15 0.15 0.02
450 1,399.12 339.45 0.24 -1.10 1,380.83 223.84 0.16 0.05
500 1,352.35 355.84 0.26 -1.08 1,332.97 234.34 0.18 0.08
With direct payment
50 2,244.41 196.93 0.09 -0.77 2,233.98 137.59 0.06 0.08
100 2,310.97 205.79 0.09 -0.85 2,300.85 145.39 0.06 0.08
150 2,318.14 195.77 0.08 -1.16 2,308.79 133.21 0.06 -0.10
200 2,382.75 215.74 0.09 -1.25 2,372.21 143.91 0.06 -0.18
250 2,441.09 243.62 0.10 -1.24 2,428.84 161.23 0.07 -0.15
300 2,475.95 271.26 0.11 -1.20 2,462.01 179.19 0.07 -0.10
350 2,485.11 296.95 0.12 -1.16 2,469.56 196.10 0.08 -0.04
400 2,471.35 319.96 0.13 -1.12 2,454.32 211.15 0.09 0.02
450 2,439.12 339.45 0.14 -1.10 2,420.83 223.84 0.09 0.05
500 2,392.35 355.84 0.15 -1.08 2,372.97 234.34 0.10 0.08
Alternatives in italic indicate non-feasible solutions under the cross-compliance scheme (i.e., a restriction on nitrogen use)
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insurance and direct payment, the coefficient of variation
of quasi rents for N = 200 kg ha-1 reduces to 0.06.
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the distribu-
tions of quasi rents under future climatic conditions. We
find that climate change increases quasi rents (due to yield
increases) but leads to over-proportional increases in the
variability. Thus, coefficients of variation of quasi rents for
the climate-change scenario are higher than for the BASE
scenario. With respect to the effects of direct payments and
insurance, similar effects as described for current climate
are observed. In summary, we find higher grassland pro-
duction risks in future, but both direct payments and
insurance seem to be potentially powerful tools to reduce
these risks.
Results for certainty equivalents
In order to evaluate the different alternatives (under dif-
ferent climate regimes) for a risk-averse farmer, the quasi
rents described in Tables 4 and 5 are used to assess the
respective certainty equivalents (Eq. 5) of these alterna-
tives. The results for quasi rents and certainty equivalents
(with and without insurance) are summarized in Fig. 1. The
exact estimates and confidence intervals are presented in
the ‘‘Appendix’’.
For the BASE scenario, Fig. 1a shows that the rela-
tionship between nitrogen and profits as well as certainty
equivalents is inverse U-shaped. Increasing nitrogen
application leads to increasing marginal quasi rents (and
certainty equivalents), which decrease after a maximum
has been reached. It shows that the risk premium (i.e., the
difference between mean quasi rents and certainty equiv-
alents) increases with nitrogen application, particularly
because nitrogen increases the variance of grassland yields.
For the risk-neutral farmer, the optimal amount of nitrogen
that maximizes expected profits is equal to 350 kg ha-1. In
contrast, a risk-averse farmer would maximize certainty
equivalents with 300 kg ha-1. Because nitrogen is a risk
increasing input, risk aversion reduces the incentives to use
this input. It shows that if there is the possibility to use a
farm-level yield insurance, the risk-averse farmer would
produce more intensively using a nitrogen application of
N = 350 kg ha-1. Thus, the presence of an insurance
scheme increases the incentive to intensify grassland
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics of quasi rents (in CHF ha-1) for the climate-change scenario
N (kg ha-1) Without insurance With insurance
Mean (CHF ha-1) SD (CHF ha-1) CV (-) Skewness (-) Mean (CHF ha-1) SD (CHF ha-1) CV (-) Skewness (-)
w/o direct payment
50 1,520.19 318.98 0.21 0.54 1,504.55 258.56 0.17 1.34
100 1,508.81 322.99 0.21 0.52 1,493.68 264.13 0.18 1.29
150 1,468.47 330.28 0.22 0.67 1,454.39 277.86 0.19 1.34
200 1,474.80 314.53 0.21 0.45 1,462.71 264.80 0.18 1.12
250 1,530.74 337.14 0.22 0.34 1,517.75 282.30 0.19 1.01
300 1,581.48 369.02 0.23 0.32 1,567.08 308.11 0.20 0.98
350 1,615.48 401.29 0.25 0.32 1,599.30 333.69 0.21 0.99
400 1,631.02 432.21 0.26 0.34 1,613.13 358.42 0.22 1.01
450 1,628.75 461.39 0.28 0.37 1,609.25 381.92 0.24 1.04
500 1,610.33 487.73 0.30 0.39 1,589.37 403.29 0.25 1.07
With direct payment
50 2,560.19 318.98 0.12 0.54 2,544.55 258.56 0.10 1.34
100 2,548.81 322.99 0.13 0.52 2,533.68 264.13 0.10 1.29
150 2,508.47 330.28 0.13 0.67 2,494.39 277.86 0.11 1.34
200 2,514.80 314.53 0.13 0.45 2,502.71 264.80 0.11 1.12
250 2,570.74 337.14 0.13 0.34 2,557.75 282.30 0.11 1.01
300 2,621.48 369.02 0.14 0.32 2,607.08 308.11 0.12 0.98
350 2,655.48 401.29 0.15 0.32 2,639.30 333.69 0.13 0.99
400 2,671.02 432.21 0.16 0.34 2,653.13 358.42 0.14 1.01
450 2,668.75 461.39 0.17 0.37 2,649.25 381.92 0.14 1.04
500 2,650.33 487.73 0.18 0.39 2,629.37 403.29 0.15 1.07
Alternatives in italic indicate nonfeasible solutions under the cross-compliance scheme (i.e., a restriction on nitrogen use)
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production (and making it more risky) by using more
nitrogen. Note that even though the differences in certainty
equivalents between the here considered levels of nitrogen
are small (and not significant), these results indicate the
expected effects of considering risk aversion and the
presence of insurance possibilities. Our results show that
farmers would use the farm-level yield insurance because
certainty equivalents in the BASE scenario (without direct
payments) for the insurance option are always higher than
for the noninsured alternative.
Figure 1b shows the results for the BASE scenario with
consideration of direct payments. It shows that direct
payments lead to significantly higher expected profits for
risk neutral, as well as to significantly higher certainty
equivalents for risk-averse farmers (with and without
insurance option) than for the option without direct pay-
ments. Due to the cross-compliance requirements (12 kg N
per 1 t of grassland yield), the farmer has a constraint
maximization problem. Only the application levels of 50
and 100 kg ha-1 fulfill this requirement (cp. Table 2) and
thus Nmax = 100 kg ha
-1(cp. Table 2). Consequently, the
risk-neutral farmer maximizes expected profits including
direct payments with N = 100 kg ha-1. Because this
(constrained) optimum leads to higher profits than the
unconstrained optimization, the farmer will choose the first
option that includes the receipt of direct payments. Because
the same holds for the risk-averse decision maker, we
conclude that direct payments and the according cross-
compliance scheme are always adopted in the here con-
sidered example, which is in line with high participation
rates in the cross-compliance scheme observed in
Switzerland.
Figure 1b shows furthermore that direct payments
reduce the incentives to adopt farm-level yield insurance.
Direct payments have an insurance effect itself (reducing
the relative variability of quasi rents) and reduce the
(absolute) risk aversion of the farmer (by shifting his
welfare level upwards). Hennessy (1998) provides detailed
descriptions and proofs of the insurance and wealth effects
of direct payments.7 Therefore, comparing Fig. 1a, b, the
relative risk premium (defined as RP/E(p)8) that accounts
for direct payments is much smaller than without consid-
erations of direct payments. Moreover, the (relative) dif-
ference between certainty equivalents with and without
insurance contract decreases sharply.
Fig. 1 Profits and certainty equivalents (in CHF ha-1) for the BASE
and the climate-change scenario. Note that the results displayed in this
figure assume a constant relative risk aversion of r2 = 2/E(p) and a
downside risk aversion of r3 = -6/r
2(p) (cp. ‘‘Calculation of
certainty equivalents’’)
7 Femenia et al. (2010) summarize and revisit the discussion on the
existence of this ‘‘wealth effect’’ of direct payments.
8 The risk premium RP is defined as the difference between quasi-
rents and certainty equivalents.
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In summary, under current climatic conditions (BASE
scenario), farmers in our example are expected to adopt
direct payments, use the most intensive production alter-
native that is allowed in the cross-compliance scheme
(N = 100 kg ha-1), and will not use the farm-level yield
insurance. Because the adoption of the insurance depends
strongly on the assumed risk aversion as well as the
assumed loading factor, both will be subject of sensitivity
analysis presented at the end of this section.
Figure 1c shows quasi rents and certainty equivalents
(with and without insurance) for the climate-change
scenario. We find that quasi rents and certainty equiv-
alents are higher than in the base scenario due to higher
yield levels.9 For the climate-change scenario, Fig. 1c
shows that the relationship between nitrogen and profits
as well as certainty equivalents is not strictly inverse
U-shaped. An increasing nitrogen application from 50
to 150 kg ha-1 leads—surprisingly—to decreasing
marginal profits and certainty equivalents. Thus, the
additional nitrogen fertilizer is more expensive than the
gains from higher yield levels. This response can be
explained by the interactions between grass and clover
considered in the PROGRASS model. The clover frac-
tion responds markedly to elevated CO2 concentrations,
as the latter stimulates photosynthesis in clover more
than grass and has also positive effects on symbiotic N
fixation (Hebeisen et al. 1997). Even though the chan-
ges in climatic conditions, ceteris paribus, reduce the
competitiveness of clover compared with grass (because
it is less tolerant to water stress), the overall effect for
clover in the climate-change scenario is positive (Laz-
zarotto et al. 2009; Finger et al. 2010). Because of high
biological N fixation rates (due to the high clover
content), yields are already on a high level even with-
out nitrogen fertilizer application. Thus, additional
nitrogen application (that increases grass yield but
reduces the clover content) has only a small marginal
productivity, i.e., leads only to small total grassland
yield increases. Consequently, profits and certainty
equivalents decrease with nitrogen application until
reaching a minimum at N = 150 kg ha-1, and increase
again until the (global) maximum is reached for
N = 400 kg ha-1, which is the optimal nitrogen amount
for the farmer. This result shows that climate change
induces an increase in the production intensity (from
350 to 400 kg ha-1) in an unconstrained optimization
problem.
Figure 1c shows furthermore that the relative risk pre-
mium (i.e., the difference between quasi rents and certainty
equivalents, divided by the mean quasi rent) increases with
climate change due the sharp increase in the dispersion of
quasi rents (cp. Table 4). The benefits of the farm-level
yield insurance and direct payments remain as for the
BASE scenario: risk-averse farmers would use the insur-
ance; but direct payments reduce the incentives to adopt
farm-level yield insurance (i.e., the insurance is not used).
Because direct payments lead again to significantly higher
certainty equivalents, we assume that farmers will adopt
the required cross-compliance obligations also under future
climatic conditions. The obligations imply a counter-intu-
itive effect of climate change on the production intensity:
Taking direct payments into account, farmers maximize
certainty equivalents with N = 50 kg ha-1, i.e., they pro-
duce less intensive.
Thus, the effect of climate change on grassland pro-
duction intensities is ambiguous: it increases optimal fer-
tilizer use in unconstrained production conditions but
decreases optimal fertilizer use in the presence of cross-
compliance obligations. This effect is caused by the cli-
mate change–induced changes in grass-clover competition
that have been discussed above.
In summary, we find that under future climatic condi-
tions, farmers will adopt direct payments, use low-intensity
production (N = 50 kg ha-1), and will not use the farm-
level yield insurance.
Results of the sensitivity analyses
In order to analyze the sensitivity of the results with regard
to the employed parameters in the economic model, we re-
calculate the gains in certainty equivalents from having
farm-level yield insurance (i.e., the percentage increase of
certainty equivalents due to the participation in the insur-
ance scheme) for different levels of risk aversion and
loading factors. Moreover, we consider three levels of
direct payments with 1,040, 693 and 347 CHF ha-1, rep-
resenting 100, 66 and 33% of current direct payments,
respectively. Concerning the coefficient of constant relative
risk aversion, we use levels from -1 (risk loving), 0 (risk
neutral), 1, 2, 3, and 4 (all risk averse). These 6 levels of
constant relative risk aversion are combined (in this order)
with different levels of downside risk aversion: ?1 (loving
downside risk), 0 (neutral with respect to downside risk),
-3, -6, -9, and -12 (all averse to downside risk),
respectively. The consideration of risk-loving behavior is
motivated by the findings of Koundouri et al. (2009) for
Finnish farmers. High values of risk aversion represent
rather exceptionally high risk aversion (see Gardeboek
2006, for an overview on empirical results for coefficients
of constant relative risk aversion). In this sensitivity anal-
ysis, we also consider 4 levels of loading factors: 0.4
(extremely subsidized insurance), 0.7 (highly subsidized
9 Significant increases for quasi rents are in particular indicated for
low levels of nitrogen application (N = 50 and 100 kg ha-1, cp.
‘‘Appendix’’).
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insurance), 1 (moderately subsidized insurance, leading to
a ‘fair premium’) and 1.3 (unsubsidized insurance, con-
sidering costs of the insurance company). While the
loading factor of 1.3 might reflect the real costs (and
premiums) of an insurer under free market conditions,
lower values incorporate different degrees of (govern-
mental) subsidies for the considered farm-level yield
insurance. Current subsidies for insurance premiums in
Europe range from 0% to about 75% (Bielza et al. 2008).
Results for the sensitivity analysis are shown in Fig. 2.
Because the results for the BASE scenario lead to
qualitatively similar results, we display the results for the
climate-change scenario only. It shows that for risk-
averse farmers, higher direct payments lead to lower
gains from the insurance due to the insurance and wealth
effects of direct payments. Subsidies for the insurance
premiums increase the gains from insurances for all
farmers. Moreover, it shows that higher risk aversion
leads to higher gains from the insurance. For high rates
of subsidies for the insurance premiums (i.e., the loading
factors of 0.4 and 0.7), insurance is even profitable for
risk-neutral and risk-loving farmers. In contrast, a fair
insurance premium (loading factor equal to 1) makes
insurance unattractive for risk-loving farmers and makes
risk-neutral farmers indifferent between adoption and
nonadoption of the insurance. Without subsidies on
premiums (loading factor equal to 1.3), only farmers with
moderate and high risk aversion would use the insurance.
For the specific case of risk aversion being equal to 2 and
loading factor equal to 1.3, it shows that direct payments
trigger the adoption of farm-level yield insurance (i.e.,
direct payments lead to nonadoption of the insurance).
With regard to the loading factors of insurance premi-
ums, our results are in line with the findings of Just et al.
(1999) that insurance subsidies might be more important
for the decision to participate in an insurance scheme
than the risk aversion of the farmer. Thus, our results
suggest that there is a large policy influence on the
choice of a specific risk management measure to cope
with climate change–induced production risks in grass-
land production.
Discussion
Our analysis of climate-change impacts and adaptation in
grassland production was limited to a case study refer-
ring to a specific grass-clover system, having the Swiss
Plateau as geographic focus, and considering only one
emission and climate-change scenario. Thus, the results
cannot provide the basis for general conclusions. Spe-
cifically, there can be objections concerning the choice
of a single emission and climate-change scenario. In
general, consideration of a full basket of future pathways
is necessary to quantify uncertainties and therefore put
specific impact assessments into a broader context. More
specifically, the use of multiple scenarios would have
permitted us to draw conclusions on a more general
basis. We opted for the A2 emission scenario and one
specific set of climate simulations (the PRUDENCE runs
with the CHRM model) as we wanted to set up an
illustrative case study that envisages substantial changes
in the future climate conditions, providing means to
better size the implications for adaptation at the regional
scale (cp. Table 1). An important aspect of the scenario
development was the application of the stochastic
weather generator LARS-WG to obtain unbiased daily
and (after further post-processing) hourly weather data.
As noted in Orlandini et al. (2008), one of the main
difficulties encountered in working directly with the
output of global or regional climate models is their
insufficient spatial resolution and the existence of sys-
tematic biases in key meteorological fields. In particular,
current modeling systems show a tendency to overesti-
mate the number of rainy days but underestimate rainfall
intensity (Frei et al. 2003). Although there are specific
correction procedures for improving modeled precipita-
tion (e.g., Schmidli et al. 2006; Rivington et al. 2008),
the use of weather generators is a common approach to
ensure consistency between the different meteorological
variables (e.g., Hansen et al. 2006). As discussed in
Fig. 2 Sensitivity analysis: relative certainty equivalent gains from
insurance for different rates of risk aversion, loading factors, and
direct payments. Note that for the case of a fair premium (loading
factor = 1), the certainty equivalent gain from insurance for a risk-
neutral decision maker is zero, irrespectively from direct payments.
Thus, the respective points in Fig. 2 overlap
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Lazzarotto et al. (2010), the specific weather generator
adopted for the present study proved to work satisfac-
torily for our study site.
In our analysis, expected adaptation responses were
analyzed from the farmers’ perspective, i.e., we investi-
gated what adjustments are expected to be made by the
farmer in response to climate change. In order to derive
optimal adaptation responses from the policy makers’ (or
societal) perspective, other goal functions have to be
employed that account for climate change mitigation and
nature conservation (e.g., Holzka¨mper et al. 2010). A
comparison of optimal responses from different perspec-
tives can show in which field policy actions are required to
support sustainable adaptation to climate change. Note that
the here presented optimization problem for the farmer did
not account for tactical decisions, i.e., management
adjustments due to specific weather conditions within a
growing season were not considered. The here derived
optimal management decisions rather reflect average
decisions taken by the farmer. Thus, our analysis consid-
ered only strategic adjustments of the production intensity
and the use of insurance. The integration of tactical (e.g.,
daily) decisions of farmers in bio-economic modeling
approaches is a task for further research (e.g., Antle et al.
2004).
Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we assess climate-change impacts on an
intensively managed grass/clover system at the Swiss
Plateau using simulated field experiments for 10 different
levels of nitrogen application. To this end, we employ
the process-based grassland model PROGRASS that
accounts for above- and below-ground processes in plant
and soil as well as for the interactions between grass and
clover. Taking the CO2 fertilization effect into account, it
shows that grasslands yields increase in future. However,
this yield increase is accompanied by a sharp increase in
yield variability. Thus, climate change increases yield
levels but also increases production risks in grassland
production.
We show that the dynamics and interactions of grass and
clover are essential for the vulnerability of the grassland
system to climatic stress and its response to fertilizer
application. Our results suggest that the analysis of risks in
grassland production requires models that take these
dynamics into account. Thus, bio-economic modeling can
be enhanced by taking the complexity of the processes in
agro-ecosystems explicitly into account. Furthermore, the
use of process-based models for the analysis and mea-
surement of grassland production risks (e.g., for an insur-
ance) might re-solve problems of low data availability for
grassland production (i.e., a lack of farm production
records).
In order to economically evaluate the results from
simulated field trials, quasi rents (revenue minus variable
costs) are used to calculate certainty equivalents for dif-
ferent levels of nitrogen application. To identify potential
risk management strategies, we consider a farm-level yield
insurance under current and future climatic conditions. In
this insurance scheme, the farmer is indemnified if his
actual yield falls below the 90th percentile of his expected
(i.e., average) yield. Moreover, we consider direct pay-
ments and their role on farmers’ decision making by
accounting for their wealth and insurance effect as well as
related cross-compliance requirements. In the economic
decision model, we assume that risk-averse farmers max-
imize certainty equivalents with respect to the level of
nitrogen application, the adoption of insurance and the
inclusion in the cross-compliance scheme (that implies the
receipt of direct payments).
It shows that farm-level yield insurance reduces the
variability of quasi rents and leads to more positively
skewed distributions of quasi rents, i.e. reduces the risk
of facing low-income outcomes. Thus, farm-level yield
insurance is a powerful tool to manage current and
future climate risks in grassland production. The here
considered unsubsidized insurance (not accounting
for direct payments) would be adopted by a moderate
risk-averse farmer under current and future climatic
conditions. However, direct payments reduce farmers’
benefits from insurance. This is due to the assumption
that the receipt of direct payments induces an insurance
effect, i.e., reduces the relative variability of quasi
rents, and induces a wealth effect, i.e., reduces his risk
aversion.
A sensitivity analysis that considers different levels of
risk aversion, direct payments, and subsidies to the insur-
ance premiums (i.e., loading factors) showed that higher
risk aversion increases the benefits from insurance. It
showed furthermore that the premium subsidy plays a
substantial role in insurance adoption. Under highly sub-
sidized insurance premiums, even risk-loving farmers
would adopt insurance, while unsubsidized insurance
would be adopted only by highly risk-averse decision
makers. Thus, insurance subsidization might induce free-
riding effects because expected returns are higher than the
premiums paid, making the insurance to a governmental
transfer instrument. In order to use, in general, insurance as
risk management measure only, governmental subsidies
should be moderate.
In order to cope with climate change–induced risk
increases, the support for insurance schemes has clear
advantages over subsidies for other risk management
tools. Farm-level yield insurance is a management option
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against all possible natural sources of risk, expanding the
scope of currently used elementary risk insurance. In
particular, this farm yield insurance covers also yield
reductions due to water shortages and excess precipita-
tion, which are expected to become more frequent in the
future. Moreover, insuring grassland yields implies much
less environmental harms (in particular in presence of
cross-compliance requirements for input use) compared
with other risk management strategies such as the wide-
spread adoption of grassland irrigation (e.g., Baldock
et al. 2000).
In summary, our results show that grassland yields are
expected to increase under future climate conditions, par-
ticularly due to increasing CO2 concentrations. However,
we find that grassland production will also become more
risky due to climate change. The use of insurances is a
powerful tool for farmers to adapt to these increasing risks.
Moreover, governmental support for an introduction of
additional insurance solutions might thus be a valuable
adaptation strategy to cope with climate change at the
national scale.
In order to increase the relevance and applicability of
insurance solutions for farming practices, further steps
may be necessary. To integrate also quality-related risks
in grassland production into insurance solutions, further
research should address both quantity and quality issues
combined in insurance provisions. In addition, further
research should consider harvesting risks due to unfa-
vorable weather conditions that might imply additional
costs for conservation, e.g., for haymaking, and reduce
yield quality. Finally, to overcome costly monitoring as
well as problems of moral hazard and adverse selection
that are associated with the here analyzed farm-level
yield insurance, alternative insurance mechanisms such
as weather index and area yield index based instruments
should be considered, which has been recently intro-
duced in US pasture, rangeland, and forage insurance
schemes.10
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10 Program details and descriptions are available at the USDA
homepage: http://www.rma.usda.gov/policies/pasturerangeforage/,
accessed March, 04, 2011.
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